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Abstract 
Prior research show that banks have various motivations for influencing loan loss provisions. This study 
examines these motivations and the behaviour of loan loss provision in relation to the business cycle. 
After controlling for the impact of Basel regulation on LLP, I find strong evidence for income smoothing, 
capital management and procyclical LLP behaviour during the voluntary, not mandatory, adoption of 
IFRS in Nigeria. I find evidence of signaling only after including interaction terms in the model. 
Additionally, I find that (i) banks increase loan loss provisioning after the implementation of Basel; (ii) 
banks have some incentive to signal via LLP in the post-IFRS period relative to the pre-IFRS period (iii) 
banks have joint motivations to manipulate LLP and may face trade-offs in the choice of managing 
regulatory capital or smoothing income in the post-IFRS period. Overall, I conclude that IFRS reinforces 
LLP motivations and procyclical patterns. The findings of this paper are relevant to current concerns of 
accounting standard setters and bank regulators on the current model of loan loss provisioning as well as 
the on-going debate on the mandatory implementation of IFRS in Nigeria. 
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1. Introduction 
Provision for bad debt or loan loss provision, hereafter LLP, is a deduction from bank net interest income 
to cover expected credit losses on bank loan portfolio. Bank regulators continue to stress that loan loss 
provision should be sufficient to minimize loan loss on bank loan portfolio. However, emerging empirical 
studies suggests that bank managers may have other incentive(s) to influence or manipulate reported loan 
loss provision estimates other than mitigating expected credit loss. Though standard setters emphasize 
transparency in the measurement of provisioning estimates to avoid opportunistic managerial behaviour, 
studies find that banks may influence LLP to reduce the variability of income (income smoothing), 
manage regulatory capital, and signal loan quality. Also, studies in the banking literature, argue that bad 
debt provisioning is procyclical with the business cycle. They argue that banks delay provisions until it is 
too late. The effect of the 2008 financial crisis has raised debates among regulators and academics about 
IFRS’s backward looking provisioning model.  
Motivated by these concerns and the voluntary adoption of IFRS reporting among commercial banks in 
Nigeria, I examine whether bank managers influence LLP to smooth income, manage capital, signal loan 
quality and whether provisioning is procyclical with the business cycle during the voluntary adoption of 
IFRS. Furthermore, I test for joint motivations in the pre- and post-crisis period and IFRS period. First, I 
predict and find strong evidence for income smoothing in the post IFRS period after controlling for Basel 
capital regulation. Second, I predict and find strong evidence that banks use LLP to manage regulatory 
(Tier 1) capital to avoid violating regulatory capital requirements. Third, I find evidence for signaling in 
the IFRS period. Based on further test, I find evidence that managers may have joint motivations for 
influencing loan loss provision estimates. Finally, I predict and find that banks delay provisions until a 
recession materializes.  
First, this paper contributes to the accounting choice literature which suggest that managers have various 
incentives for choosing and influencing some accounting numbers, in this case, loan loss provisions. 
Second, this paper contributes to the recent literature in favour of the debate to improve the current IFRS 
provisioning model which is highly criticized for its inherent procyclical pattern. Third, this paper 
contributes to the banking literature on bank capital adequacy. The literature argues that strong capital 
buffers ensure that bank capital is sufficient to absorb unexpected losses and external shocks. I find that 
banks use LLP as a form of capital which can be increased (decreased) when capital is low (high). Fourth, 
this paper is the first to examine income smoothing, earnings management, signaling and procyclicality of 
LLP in Nigeria. I provide a developing country evidence for the concerns raised about the validity of 
IFRS’s current provisioning model. By employing recent bank data, inferences based on the result may 
inform financial reporting policies. Finally, this empirical evidence contributes to the current debate that 
criticizes the recent mandatory implementation of IFRS by the Central bank of Nigeria in 2012. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the empirical literature and 
develops the hypotheses based on the literature review. Section 3 presents the methodology. Section 4 
discusses the empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
LLP and earnings management  
Earlier studies documents evidence for earnings management using LLP (Ma, 1988; Hasan and Hunter, 
1994; Lobo and Yang, 2001; Hasan and Wall, 2003). Also, the recent literature provide evidence for 
income smoothing. For example, Kanagaretnam et al., (2004) found that banks use discretionary LLP to 
smooth income but not to signal private information. Anandarajan et al. (2007) show that publicly traded 
commercial banks in Australia engage in earnings management practices. Perez et al. (2008) found 
evidence for income smoothing using 142 Spanish banks from 1986 to 2002. Leventis et al. (2012), using 
a sample of 91 EU banks, found that income smoothing is more pronounced among risky banks but this 
smoothing behaviour is less aggressive after implementation of IFRS. In a US study, El Sood (2012) 
found strong evidence for income smoothing. Balbao et al. (2013), using 9442 US banks from 1999 to 
2008, found evidence for income smoothing but suggest that this relationship may be driven by non-linear 
patterns. Curcio and Hassan (2013) find strong evidence for income smoothing among non-EU credit 
institutions. They report that EU firms within markets with high protection of creditor right do not smooth 
income. On the other hand, some studies show conflicting evidence (for example, Wetmore and Brick, 
1994; Ahmed et al., 1999). Ahmed et al. (1999) found no evidence to support the income smoothing 
hypothesis after the implementation of Basel 1. Overall, the literature documents more positive evidence 
of smoothing via LLP. Therefore, consistent with these studies, I hypothesize that there is a positive 
relation between LLP and pre- tax and pre-provision earnings in the post-IFRS period. This follows the 
reasoning that when bank profits is abnormally high (low) banks tend to increase (decrease) LLP either to 
minimize the volatility of earnings or to avoid regulatory scrutiny (Wall and Koch, 2000). Thus,  
H1: A positive relation exist between LLP and pre-tax and pre-provision earnings in the post IFRS 
period. 
 
 
LLP and signaling 
Managers tend to signal private information about their firm to reduce information asymmetry and to 
communicate positive inside information to investors (Akerlof, 1970). The literature reports a positive 
relation between stock returns and abnormal LLPs and a negative relation between normal LLP and stock 
returns, suggesting that investors perceive LLP as a tool used to signal private information about future 
firm performance (Wahlen, 1994; Beaver and Engel, 1996; Liu et al. 1997). After controlling for non-
discretionary changes in LLP, Wahlen (1994) found a positive relation between discretionary provisions 
and stock returns and future cash flow which suggest that investors interpret abnormal provisions as a 
signal of good news rather than as a signal of bad news (high expected credit losses). Liu et al. (1997) 
reports that investors interpret high LLP as good news when banks are experiencing default problems. 
Also, they showed that banks, with low regulatory capital ratio in the fourth fiscal year, had positive stock 
market reaction following unexpected increase in LLP. Kanagaretnam et al. (2005) found that the 
propensity to signal private information is positively related to the degree of information asymmetry and 
that undervalued banks use LLP to signal private information about future performance. Bouvatier and 
Lepetit (2008) in a study of European banks found evidence to support the signaling hypothesis. Curcio 
and Hasan (2013), investigated earnings management in the context of the capital adequacy among EU 
banks and non-EU credit institutions. Interestingly, they found that non-Euro area banks use earnings to 
signal private information to investors. On the other hand, Ahmed et al. (1999) did not find strong 
evidence to support the signaling hypothesis among US banks. In a study of Spanish commercial banks, 
Anandarajan et al. (2003) and Perez et al. (2008) both do not find strong evidence to support the signaling 
hypothesis. Subsequently, Anandarajan et al. (2007) found insufficient evidence to support the signaling 
theory among Australian banks. 
To develop the signaling hypothesis, Wahlen (1994) suggests that LLP will contain some positive signal 
about loan quality after controlling for other non-discretionary indicators of loan default such as changes 
in non-performing loans and loan charge-offs. Following this reasoning, if bank managers believe that 
investors view abnormal increase in LLP as a signal of loan quality, a positive relation between LLP and 
future earnings can be expected. Also, IFRS emphasizes the need to disclose information to investors and 
other users of financial reports. Therefore, bank managers, under IFRS, might take advantage of this 
disclosure opportunity, to use LLP to signal loan quality to investors, implying a positive relation. Similar 
to prior studies, I hypothesize: 
H2: A positive relation between LLP and one-year ahead change in pre-provision earnings in the post 
IFRS period is expected. 
LLP and regulatory capital management 
Prior studies suggest that, to avoid the cost associated with violating capital regulatory requirements, bank 
tend to manage regulatory capital using LLP (Whalen, 1994; Ahmed et al., 1999). These studies argue 
that banks tend to increase (decrease) LLP when regulatory capital is low (high) (Moyer, 1990; Beaver 
and Engel, 1996; Wall and Koch, 2000). For example, Moyer (1990) finds that managers adjust the 
timing of LLP to avoid violating bank capital limit. Beatty et al. (1995) argue that LLP influences loan 
quality and capital management decisions. Similarly, Ahmed et al. (1999) found evidence that banks use 
LLP to manage capital adequacy ratios to avoid violating minimum capital requirement. Anandarajan et 
al. (2007) found evidence to support the capital management hypothesis. Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008), 
investigating the pro-cyclical behavior for 186 European banks, found that banks with low capital use 
LLP to manage regulatory capital. On the other hand, some country-specific studies find no evidence to 
support the capital management hypothesis (Perez et al. 2008; Leventis et al., 2011). Leventis et al. 
(2011), using a sample of 91 banks found no evidence for capital management after the implementation of 
IFRS. 
After the convergence to Basel capital regulation in Nigeria immediately after the crisis, there were costs 
associated with violating minimum capital requirement. If the cost of violation is perceived to be severe, 
bank managers may have an incentive to influence regulatory capital ratio via LLP. This is consistent 
with Ahmed et al. (1999) and Wall and Koch (2000). This incentive will be greater if banks view LLP as 
a form of capital. Therefore, I hypothesize: 
H3: A negative relation between LLP and Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio in the post-IFRS period. 
LLP and Procyclicality 
Studies report that LLP is negatively related to the business cycle measured by GDP growth rate (Arpa et 
al., 2001; Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; Perez et al., 2006; Floro, 2010; 
Packer and Zhu, 2012). Laeven and Majnoni (2002) found that banks delay provisioning until it is too 
late, suggesting procyclical LLP behaviour. Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) did not find evidence that 
banks in OECD countries increased provisions in periods of economic boom in anticipation of a 
recession. Perez et al. (2006) investigated the determinants of LLP among Spanish banks and found LLP 
to be procyclical. Beaty and Liao (2009) found that banks delay the timing of provisioning until 
recessionary periods sets in. They argue that increased loan loss provisioning during a recessionary period 
further reinforces the recession. Floro (2010) finds procyclical provisioning behaviour of among banks in 
Philippine but noted that such relationship is influenced in a nonlinear way by bank capitalization. Packer 
and Zhu (2012), in a study of Asian banks, found that provisioning was procyclical among Japanese bank 
but countercyclical for banks in India. Therefore, consistent with these literature, I hypothesize that banks 
delay increased provisioning until a recession sets in. Therefore, I hypothesize: 
H4: A positive relation between LLP and change in gross domestic product in the post-IFRS period. 
 
3.  Methodology 
3.1 Data and sample selection 
The dataset employed in this study were extracted from bank financial statement and World Bank 
database. Data were carefully reviewed for inconsistencies. Concerning outliers in the data, I did not 
proceed to exclude data in the upper and lower bounds of the distributions because the data is not large 
due to the small commercial bank population in Nigeria. Also, I do not want to lose further observations 
which could deteriorate the validity of inferences made based on the findings. Sample bank inclusion 
criteria include: (i) bank must have existed from 2002; (ii) bank voluntarily adopted IFRS reporting from 
2009; (iii) bank was subject to Basel capital regulatory requirements with the evidence of reporting Tier 1 
capital as well as total regulatory capital ratio; (iv) bank must have complete data, otherwise, it is 
excluded; (v) only commercial banks are included to ensure that sample banks face homogenous 
investment activities and financing methods, thus, development banks, merchant banks, savings, thrifts 
and cooperative banks are excluded. A final sample of 10 banks for a 12-year period, i.e. 2002-2013 
which gives a total of 120 bank-year observations. This period is sufficient enough to capture economic 
downturn and upturns, financial crisis as well as alternative regulatory regimes (IFRS and Basel). 
3.2 Model Specification 
To test the three hypotheses - income smoothing, regulatory capital and signaling, I adopt a modified 
model derived from existing models in the literature (Ahmed et al., 1999; Anandarajan, et al., 2007; and 
Leventis et al., 2011). The modelling of LLP takes the functional form below: 
LLP = f [(non-discretionary), (discretionary), (control variables)] 
For this study, the econometric model adopted is panel-data regression with fixed effects. 
LLPi,t = α1 + α2 NPLi,t + α3 LLPi,t-1 + α4 LOANi,t  + α5 EBTPi,t + α6 SIGNi,t + α7 GDPRj,t + α8 SIZEi,t + 
α9 IFRSj + α10 POSTj + α11 EBTP*IFRSi,t + α12 SIGN*IFRSi,t + α13EBTP*MCAPi,t + α14TRC*EBTPi,t +   
α15TRC*SIGNi,t + α16MCAP*SIGNi,t + α17MCAP*EBTP*SIGNi,t + α18TRC*EBTP*SIGNi,t +   
α19SIGN*EBTPi,t + ɛi,t 
 
Where, 
LLP - Loan loss provision divided by total assets for firm i at time t 
EBTP - Earnings before tax and provision divided by total assets for firm i at time t 
LLPt-1 - Beginning loan loss provision divided by total asset for firm i at time t  
NPL - non performing loan divided by total assets for firm i at time t 
SIGN - one-year ahead change in earnings before tax and provisions for firm i at time t 
MCAP - Tier I regulatory capital ratio for firm i at time t 
TRC - Total regulatory capital (Tier 1 + Tier 2) for firm i at time t 
GDPR- change in Gross domestic product 
SIZE - bank size derived as the natural logarithm of total assets for firm i at time t 
IFRS*EBTP- interactive variable indicating income smoothing in the post IFRS regime for firm i at time t 
IFRS*SIGN - indicating signaling in the post IFRS period for firm i at time t 
POST - dummy variable controls for pre-and post-Basel regulation and pre- and post-crisis period. 
EBTP*MCAP - indicates income smoothing and Tier 1 capital management for firm i at time t 
TRC*EBTP - indicates income smoothing and total capital management for firm i at   time t firm 
TRC*SIGN - indicates income smoothing and Tier 1 capital management for firm i   at time t 
MCAP*SIGN - indicates Tier 1 capital management and signaling for firm i at time t 
MCAP*EBTP*SIGN - indicates smoothing, signaling and Tier 1 capital management for firm i at time t 
TRC*EBTP*SIGN - indicates smoothing, signaling and total capital management for firm i at time t 
SIGN*EBTP - interactive variable indicating income smoothing and smoothing for firm i at time t 
 
 
 
 
3.3  Variable Description 
The dependent variable is LLP. After controlling for non-discretionary (NPL, LOAN, LLPt-1,) and 
discretionary influences on LLP (EBTP, SIGN, MCAP), the variables of interest in the main regression 
are IFRS*EBTP and IFRS*SIGN. Non-discretionary variables employed are non-performing loans, 
beginning loan loss provision (LLPt-i), ratio of loans and advances to customers divided by total bank 
total asset (LOAN). These variables explain external factors beyond managerial control that have an 
influence on LLP. This is consistent with prior studies (Ahmed et al, 1999; Hasan and Wall, 2004; 
Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008; Fonseca and Gonzàles, 2008). NPL controls for non-discretionary influence 
on specific provisions while LOAN controls for general reserves. A positive sign is expected because 
when banks predict that loan will go bad, they would increase provision, accordingly. Also, a positive 
sign is expected on LOAN variable. LLPt-1 should have a negative sign. It follows the reasoning that 
when banks increase provisions in the previous period, provisions for the current period is unlikely to 
increase proportionately. 
Discretionary influences on LLP include EBTP, MCAP and SIGN variable. Using the EBTP variable to 
indicate smoothing is consistent with prior studies (e.g. Ahmed et al, 1999; Anandarajan, 2007; Bouvatier 
and Lepetit, 2008; Fonseca and Gonzàles, 2008; Leventis, et al., 2011; Curcio and Hasan, 2013). A 
positive sign on the coefficient indicates income smoothing, a negative sign indicates otherwise. Also, 
Ahmed et al. (1999), Leventis, et al. (2011) and Curcio and Hasan (2013) use the relation between LLP 
and the ratio of Tier 1 capital before LLP (MCAP) to test the capital management hypothesis. MCAP is 
measured as Tier 1 capital ratio before LLP divided by minimum capital adequacy ratio. TRC is used as 
an alternative form of capital. Total regulatory capital (TRC) ratio is the sum of Tier 1 (MCAP) and Tier 
2 capital and is used to observe whether LLP is used to manage TRC. A negative sign on the MCAP 
coefficient is expected if poorly capitalized banks increase LLPs to increase bank capital to avoid 
violating capital requirement, otherwise, positive. Consistent with Ahmed et al. (1999), Bouvatier and 
Lepetit (2008), Curcio and Hasan (2013), I employ the SIGN variable defined as the one-year ahead 
change in earnings before taxes and LLPs (that is, EBTPi,t+1 - EBTPi,t)/0.5(TAi,t + TAi,t+1). TA represents 
total asset. I expect that banks may or may not take advantage of the disclosure arbitrage in IFRS to signal 
loan quality to investors. 
POST indicates the change to Basel capital regulation after the financial crisis. This dummy variable takes 
the value of 1 for post-Basel (or post crisis) period, otherwise 0. I expect increased provisioning after the 
crisis as a precautionary risk management behaviour among banks. Therefore, I expect a positive sign 
between LLP and POST. Also, I expect that IFRS dummy variables takes the value of I when banks 
voluntarily adopted IFRS and 0, otherwise. In 2009, commercial banks in Nigeria voluntarily adopted 
IFRS. However, it is difficult to predict this sign because differences in implementation and enforcement 
of IFRS across countries may significantly affect this relationship. Further, a positive sign on 
EBTP*SIGN indicates that banks jointly smooth income and signal future prospects, otherwise, negative. 
A positive sign on EBTP*MCAP and EBTP*TRC indicates greater incentives to smooth income than to 
manage capital, and vice versa. A negative sign on TRC*SIGN and MCAP*SIGN indicates greater 
incentives to manage capital than to signal, and vice versa. GDPR tests whether LLP is procyclical with 
the business cycle. This is consistent with prior studies (Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Bikker and 
Metzemakers, 2005; Anandarajan et al., 2007; Fonseca and Gonzàlez, 2008; and, Curcio and Hasan, 
2013). A negative sign indicates LLP is procyclical, otherwise, positive. Size is expected to have a 
positive sign. It follows the reasoning that large banks tend to have larger loan portfolio and will tend to 
increase provision more.  
 
4 Discussion of Empirical Results 
4.1  Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table 1 present the descriptive statistics for the full sample and pre- and post-IFRS sample period. The 
mean value of LLP in the pre-IFRS period is 0.028 while for the post-IFRS period (0.02). An increase in 
mean value of loans to customers loans (LOAN) is observed in the post-IFRS period (0.402) relative to 
pre-IFRS period (0.281). The mean ratio for profitability is higher in the post-IFRS period (0.045) relative 
to the pre-IFRS period (0.036). A decrease in bank non-performing loan is observed in the post IFRS 
period (0.058) relative to pre-IFRS period (0.72). This might suggests that banks to expect minor loans 
default in the post-IFRS period relative to the pre-IFRS period due to improved credit risk monitoring 
system and loan diversification across diverse sectors. Finally, total assets increased in the post-IFRS 
period (13.74) relative to the pre-IFRS period (12.15). Table 5 provides the Pearson correlation 
coefficients of the sample variables. In the post IFRS period, LLPs are positively and significantly 
correlated to EBTP and LOAN. All variables give the expected theoretical sign except MCAP and SIZE. 
However, these conflicting signs are not statistically significant. Finally, for the entire sample period as 
shown in Table 3, a significant positive correlation between LLP and POST is observed indicating that 
Basel capital regime, after the 2008 crisis, led to significant increase in loan loss provisioning among 
Nigerian banks. 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 Full Sample Pre-IFRS Post-IFRS Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis 
Year 2002-2012 2002-2007 2009-2013 2002-2006 2010-2013 
Variables Mean 
(SD) 
Max 
(Min) 
Mean 
(S.D) 
Max 
(Min) 
Mean 
(S.D) 
Max 
(Min) 
Mean 
(S.D) 
Max 
(Min) 
Mean 
(S.D) 
Mean 
(S.D) 
LLP 0.023 
(0.068) 
0.504 
(-0.103) 
0.028 
(0.09) 
0.504 
(0.0002) 
0.02 
(0.039) 
0.168 
(-0.103) 
0.009 
(0.011) 
0.054 
(0.0002) 
0.019 
(-0.04) 
0.168 
(-0.103) 
NPL 0.063 
(0.116) 
0.874 
0 
0.072 
(0.141) 
0.874 
(0.001) 
0.058 
(0.091) 
0.489 
0 
0.059 
(0.099) 
0.549 
(0.001) 
0.038 
(0.412) 
0.346 
0 
LLPT 0.021 
(0.067) 
0.504 
(-0.103) 
0.009 
(0.013) 
0.054 
(0) 
0.038 
(0.101) 
0.504 
(-0.104) 
0.068 
(0.007) 
0.031 
0 
0.019 
(0.035) 
0.124 
(-0.103) 
LOAN 0.337 
(0.048) 
0.617 
(0.002) 
0.281 
(0.114) 
0.493 
(0.002) 
0.402 
(0.118) 
0.617 
(0.155) 
0.293 
(0.109) 
0.493 
(0.007) 
0.393 
(0.122) 
0.617 
(0.155) 
EBTP 
 
0.04 
(0.048) 
0.362 
(-0.11) 
0.036 
(0.06) 
0.088 
(-0.027) 
0.045 
(0.071) 
0.362 
(-0.107) 
0.039 
(0.018) 
0.088 
(-0.006) 
0.045 
(0.078) 
0.362 
(-0.107) 
SIGN 0.009 
(0.031) 
0.121 
(-0.105) 
0.010 
(0.031) 
0.088 
(-0.105) 
0.006 
(0.032) 
0.121 
(-0.104) 
0.014 
(0.022) 
0.088 
(-0.038) 
0.006 
(0.034) 
0.121 
(-0.104) 
GDPR 9.923 
(8.44) 
33.7 
(3.4) 
13.12 
(10.23) 
33.7 
(3.4) 
5.86 
(1.31) 
7.8 
(4.3) 
15.34 
(10.95) 
33.7 
(3.4) 
5.6 
(1.345) 
7.8 
(4.3) 
SIZE 12.77 
(1.593) 
21.77 
(9.34) 
12.15 
(1.281) 
15.07 
(9.34) 
13.74 
(1.44) 
21.77 
(11.19) 
11.73 
(1.347) 
15.07 
(9.34) 
13.84 
(1.56) 
21.77 
(11.19) 
TRC     3.442 
(5.639) 
30.56 
(-1.82) 
  3.636 
(6.72) 
30.56 
(1.82) 
MCAP     1.708 
(2.236) 
4.49 
(-9.71) 
  1.811 
(1.422) 
4.476 
(-2.912) 
Obs. 120  60 50 50 40 
Note: SD and Min in parenthesis. S.D - Standard deviation; Max - Maximum ; Min - Minimum. 
 
4.2 Main Regression Result 
First, to test that the sign on the coefficients are consistent with theoretical expectations, I regress LLP 
with discretionary and non-discretionary variables, IFRS and POST. I exclude all interactive variables. 
Regression 1, show that all variables are consistent with theoretical expectations except SIZE and LOAN. 
Second, to examine the impact of IFRS on EBTP and SIGN, I introduce two interactive variables, 
IFRS*EBTP and IFRS*SIGN. Regression 2 show a significant positive coefficient for IFRS*EBTP and 
IFRS*SIGN at the 1% and 10% significance level, respectively. The support for smoothing and signaling 
hypothesis is significant after the inclusion of the interactive IFRS variables. Also, I find a significant 
positive sign on the POST coefficient and a significant negative sign on the IFRS dummy variable which 
suggests that regulators emphasize increased bank provisioning while the IFRS tend to discourage 
aggressive provisioning for transparency concerns. This is consistent with theory.  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Robustness Test 
Table 3 reports the robustness analysis. First, I divide the period into pre-crisis (2002-2006) and post-
crisis (2010-2013). To isolate the effect of the financial crisis, I exclude 2007-2009 bank-year 
observations. Regression 3 (i) and (ii), show that banks tend to smooth income and signal loan quality in 
the post-crisis period relative to the pre-crisis period. However, the statistical relation is insignificant. 
This insignificant relation is suspected to be caused by 2007-2009 bank-year observations that was 
excluded. However, the sign on the GDPR coefficient is statistically significant in the post crisis period 
suggesting that post-crisis loan loss provisioning is procyclical with the business cycle.  
Second, regression 4 (a) and 4 b (ii) show a significant positive relation between LLP and EBTP in the 
post-IFRS period after controlling for total capital management. Thus, providing supports for the income 
smoothing hypothesis. Also, the GDPR coefficient show evidence for LLP procyclical behaviour in the 
post-IFRS period.  
Table 2: Regression Result. 
Full Period 
(2002-2013) 
 Regression 1 
Theoretical consistency 
Regression 2 
 Main Result 
 Variables Exp. 
Sign 
Coefficient  t-statistic  p-value Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
C ? 0.115* 1.84 0.069 0.198*** 3.32 0.0012 
NPL + 0.321*** 5.71 0.000 0.238*** 4.20 0.0001 
LLPt-1 - -0.126 -1.52 0.131 -0.108 -1.39 01671 
EBTP + 0.011 0.09 0.931 -2.144*** -4.62 0.0000 
SIZE + -0.008 -1.63 0.106 -0.009** -2.01 0.0477 
SIGN + 0.102 0.57 0.568 -0.484*     -1.96 0.0534 
GDPR - -0.0007 -0.95 0.345 -0.0002 -0.28     0.7790 
IFRS ? -0.054** -2.56 0.012 -0.121*** -5.091 0.0000 
POST + 0.085*** 4.07 0.0001 0.057*** 2.85 0.0054 
LOAN + -0.07 -1.13 0.2593 -0.006 -0.101 0.9196 
IFRS*EBTP +      2.184*** 4.77 0.0000 
IFRS*SIGN ?    0.592* 1.76 0.0815* 
Adjusted R² 
F-statistic 
Observation 
0.3502 
4.635 
120 
0.4628 
6.13 
120 
Regression 1 : LLP = NPL + LLPt-1 + EBTP + SIZE + SIGN + GDPR + IFRS + POST + LOAN 
Regression 2: LLP= NPL+ LLPt-1 + LOAN + EBTP + SIGN + POST+ GDPR + IFRS + IFRS*SIGN +   
IFRS*EBTP 
Note: All regression model includes fixed effects. Significant at 10%*, 5%** and 1%*** (two-tailed test). POST 
dummy is used to capture change to capital regime rather than MCAP and TRC because bank data on Basel 
regulatory capital ratio was not available until 2008. 
Third, to test the capital management hypothesis using Tier 1 capital (MCAP), I model the regression by 
introducing MCAP and TRC separately into two regression [4b (i) and (ii)], thereafter after, I combine 
both alternative capital variables into a single regression model [4b (iii)] to observe their relation to LLP. 
I find strong evidence to support the capital management hypothesis in the post-IFRS period relative to 
the pre-IFRS period as shown in Regression 4b (i) and (iii). It reports a significant negative relation 
between LLP and MCAP (t-stat = -3.48) in the post-IFRS period. 
Finally, testing for joint motivations in the post IFRS period in regression 4b (iii), I find a significant 
positive sign on EBTP*MCAP coefficient (3.94). This suggest that when banks are faced with two 
conflicting motivations, that is, smoothing and capital management, Nigerian bank managers may prefer 
to smooth income rather than manage regulatory capital. This is inferred based on the more positive sign 
on the EBTP*MCAP interactive variable. Also, when faced with the choice between signaling and capital 
management (MCAP*SIGN), Nigerian banks may prefer to manage Tier 1 capital than to signal loan 
quality. This is indicated by the significant negative sign on the MCAP*SIGN coefficient (-1.73, α=10%). 
Interestingly, I find strong evidence that banks in Nigeria seem to have no incentive to jointly smooth 
income and signal loan quality. This is inferred from SIGN*EBTP (-3.68, α=1%) 
 
5. Conclusion 
Consistent with Healy and Wahlen (1999), it is important for regulators to understand accrual-based 
accounting numbers used by bank managers to influence reported earnings, as well as, bank capital. The 
findings in this study is the first to provide evidence for smoothing, signaling and capital management via 
LLP in Nigeria. Ahmed et al. (2014) only examined income smoothing via LLP. In the present study, I 
test whether LLPs is used for capital management, earnings management and signaling in Nigerian banks 
during the voluntary adoption of IFRS. Overall, I find evidence to indicate that Nigerian banks use LLP to 
manage capital, smooth reported earnings and signal loan quality in the post-IFRS period. Also, I find 
increased bank provisioning following the implementation of Basel capital regulation immediately after 
the 2008 financial crisis. Finally, a robustness analysis show that joint motivations to influence LLP 
exists, as well as, trade-offs between two or more motivations. My findings indicate that, during IFRS 
reporting periods, reported earnings and related accounting numbers do not truly reflect the underlying 
economic reality of Nigerian banks based on the results. Standard setters and bank regulators (IASB and 
the Central Bank of Nigeria) might consider the prevalence of these motivations when evaluating the risk 
profile of banks and how these motivations, if pervasive, might pose systemic risk on the financial 
system. Finally, it is expected that a policy maker might conclude that these motivations indicate 
manipulative accounting practices by bank managers, however, policy implications drawn from the 
results in this study should take into consideration the fact that bank regulatory incentives may also have 
encouraged these motivations as well. IFRS alone is not to blame. Future research may examine other 
accounting numbers, accrual-based or based on real activities, which banks might influence to manage 
earnings and capital.   
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Tables 
 
Table 3: Robustness Regression 
 Regression 3 Regression 4 
Pre-crisis 
(2002-2006) 
Post-Crisis 
(2010-2013) 
Pre-IFRS (2002-2007) 
(a) 
Post-IFRS (2009-2013) 
(b) 
(i) (ii) (i) (ii) MCAP (i) TRC (ii) Interaction (iii) 
Variables Coeff 
t-stat 
p-value Coeff 
t-stat 
p-value Coeff 
t-stat 
p-value Coeff 
t-stat 
p-value Coeff 
t-stat 
p-value Coeff 
t-stat 
p-value 
C 0.087** 
2.34 
 
0.0254 0.056 
0.56 
0.5822 0.305** 
2.16 
0.0364 0.025 
0.42 
0.6792 -0.006 
-0.1 
0.9208 0.015 
0.29 
0.7745 
NPL 0.041** 
2.55 
0.0158 0.234 
1.56 
0.1332 0.140* 
1.81 
0.0777 0.3743*** 
3.85 
0.0005 0.134* 
1.72 
0.0953 0.309*** 
3.55 
0.0013 
LLPT -0.188 
-0.94 
0.3561 -0.055 
-0.24 
0.815 2.283** 
2.43 
0.0193 -0.029 
0.43 
0.6709 -0.0914 
-1.52 
0.1378 0.014 
0.21 
0.8382 
EBTP -0.285* 
-1.83 
0.0769 0.079 
0.65 
0.5218 -2.728*** 
-3.89 
0.0003 -0.483 
-1.73 
0.0925 0.529* 
2.0 
0.0536 0.529* 
2.0 
0.0536 
SIZE -0.006** 
-2.09 
0.0436 -0.004 
-0.84 
0.4108 -0.017* 
-1.71 
0.0945 0.0007 
0.18 
0.8586 0.0004 
0.11 
0.9168 -0.0004 
-0.14 
0.8929 
SIGN 0.075 
0.86 
0.3942 0.142 
0.68 
0.5033 -0.241 
-0.57 
0.5685 0.243 
1.11 
0.2737 -0.38 
-1.42 
0.1659 -0.077 
-0.23 
0.8929 
GDPR 0.00007 
-0.57 
0.5701 -0.013** 
-2.16 
0.0421 0.0001 
0.17 
0.8607 -0.014*** 
-2.922 
0.0062 -0.011** 
-2.28 
0.0289 -0.012** 
-2.67 
0.0123 
LOAN 0.001 
0.084 
0.9328 0.204 
1.19 
0.2452 -0.011 
-0.13 
0.8953 0.169** 
2.22 
0.0334 0.139* 
1.87 
0.070 0.169** 
2.45 
0.0204 
TRC   -0.0003 
-0.27 
0.7874     0.007 
1.57 
0.1249 0.016** 
3.37 
0.0022 
MCAP   0.002 
0.185 
0.8551   -0.012* 
-1.72 
0.094   -0.026** 
-3.48 
0.0016 
EBTP*MCAP       0.299* 
2.033 
0.0501   0.67*** 
3.97 
0.0004 
TRC*EBTP         -0.182* 
-1.70 
0.0985 -0.427*** 
-3.54 
0.0014 
TRC*SIGN         0.242*** 
3.136 
0.0036 0.33*** 
2.85 
0.0081 
MCAP*SIGN       0.025 
0.24 
0.8144   -0.29* 
-1.73 
0.0941 
MCAP*EBTP
*SIGN 
      3.98 
1.26 
0.2170   5.684 
1.43 
0.1630 
TRC*EBTP* 
SIGN 
        2.743 
1.085 
0.2860 6.73** 
2.14 
0.0409 
SIGN*EBTP       -7.648 
-1.37 
0.1811 -6.012 
-0.94 
0.3540 -25.81*** 
-3.68 
0.0009 
Adj R² 
F-stat 
P(F-stat) 
0.4574 
3.58*** 
0.0009 
 0.3301 
2.07* 
0.056 
 0.6001 
6.553 
0.000 
 0.3551 
2.69*** 
0.008 
 0.2824 
2.205** 
0.027 
 0.5289 
3.75*** 
0.0006 
Obs. 50  40  60  50  50  50  
Regression 3 (i) & 4(a): LLP = NPL + LLPt-1 + LOAN+ EBTP+ SIGN+ SIZE+ GDPR 
Regression  b (i):  LLP = NPL + LLPt-1 + LOAN + EBTP + SIGN + MCAP + SIZE + GDPR 
Model b (ii) (excludes MCAP):  LLP = NPL + LLPt-1 + LOAN + EBTP + SIGN + TRC + SIZE + GDPR 
Model b (iii) (combines TRC+MCAP): LLP = NPL + LLPt-1 + LOAN+ EBTP + SIGN + MCAP + TRC+ SIZE + GDPR + EBTP*MCAP + TRC*EBTP + TRC*SIGN + MCAP*SIGN +   
MCAP*EBTP*SIGN + TRC*EBTP*SIGN+SIGN*EBTP 
Note: Fixed effects for all regression models, apply. Significant at 10%*, 5%** and 1%*** (two-tailed test).  The pre-and post-crisis regressions excludes 2007-2009 
bank-year observation to control for the severe impact of the crisis on balance sheet of Nigerian banks 
 
 
 
Table 3: Full Sample period pearson correlation coefficients 
           
           Correlation          
Probability LLP  NPL  LLPt-1  LOAN  EBTP  SIGN  GDPR  POST  IFRS  SIZE  
LLP  1.000          
 -----           
           
NPL  0.515*** 1.000         
 0.000 -----          
           
LLPt-1  0.048 0.267 1.000        
 0.598 0.003 -----         
           
LOAN  -0.101 -0.041 0.111 1.000       
 0.273    0.658 0.229 -----        
           
EBTP  -0.027 0.021 0.032 0.298 1.000      
 0.769 0.823 0.731 0.001 -----       
           
SIGN  0.114 0.181 0.087 0.055   0.0465 1.000     
 0.217 0.048 0.342 0.554 0.614 -----      
           
GDPR  -0.091 0.044 -0.097 -0.145 0.019 0.017 1.000    
 0.322 0.635 0.287 0.112 0.838 0.853 -----     
           
POST  0.182** 0.052 0.1934 0.374 0.017 0.0954 -0.4749 1.000   
 0.047 0.576 0.034 0.000 0.853 0.3002 0.000 -----    
           
IFRS  -0.035 -0.043 0.211 0.439 0.075 -0.064 -0.408 0.845 1.000  
 0.705 0.642 0.021 0.000 0.416 0.485 0.000 0.000 -----   
           
SIZE  -0.055 -0.081 0.1165 0.239 -0.155 -0.103 -0.386 0.548 0.517 1.000 
 0.546 0.381 0.205 0.009 0.091 0.261 0.000 0.000 0.000 -----  
           
Note: p-values (below pearson correlation coefficients). Correlation coefficient (above p-values) 
           
 
 
 
 
         
         
Table 5: Correlation Post IFRS          
         
           
           Correlation          
Probability LLP  NPL  LLPt-1  LOAN  EBTP  SIGN  MCAP  TRC  GDPR  SIZE  
LLP  1.000         
 -----           
           
NPL  0.248*          
 0.083           
           
LLPt-1  -0.069 0.460***         
 0.631 0.001        
           
LOAN  0.358** 0.099 0.079        
 0.011 0.489 0.583        
           
EBTP  0.419*** 0.292 0.031 0.350       
 0.002 0.039 0.828 0.013       
           
SIGN  0.155 -0.003 0.212 0.129 0.069      
 0.282 0.984 0.139 0.371 0.632       
           
MCAP  0.114 -0.544 -0.429 0.428      0.018    0.169     
 0.432 0.000 0.002 0.002       0.903 0.238     
           
TRC  0.011 0.058 0.053 0.133 -0.0004    0.079 0.222    
 0.94 0.687 0.714 0.354 0.997 0.585 0.122     
           
GDPR  -0.137 0.381 0.191 0.229 -0.030 -0.189 -0.011 0.074   
 0.342 0.007 0.185 0.109 0.834 0.187 0.937 0.607   
           
SIZE  -0.046 -0.269 0.0134 0.112 -0.249 -0.161 0.168 -0.059 -0.145  
 0.748 0.058 0.926 0.438  0.081 0.264 0.243 0.679 0.315  
           
           
 
 
 
